This article presents a signature-free distributed algorithm which builds an atomic read/write shared memory on top of a fully connected peer-to-peer n-process asynchronous message-passing system in which up to t < n/3 processes may commit Byzantine failures. From a conceptual point of view, this algorithm is designed to be as close as possible to the algorithm proposed by Attiya, Bar-Noy and Dolev. J. ACM 42(1), 121-132 (1995), which builds an atomic register in an n-process asynchronous message-passing system where up to t < n/2 processes may crash. The proposed algorithm is particularly simple. It does not use cryptography to cope with Byzantine processes, and is optimal from a t-resilience point of view (t < n/3). A read operation requires O(n) messages, and a write operation requires O(n 2 ) messages.
of distributed applications can be greatly facilitated by the design and the use of underlying appropriate abstractions. This paper considers the design of such an abstraction, namely an atomic read/write memory, on top of a fully connected asynchronous message-passing distributed system made up of n processes, and where up to t processes may commit failures. The case of crash failures was solved by Attiya, Bar-Noy and Dolev in [3] where (a) it is shown that t < n/2 is an upper bound for the model parameter t, and (b) a simple, elegant, and t-resilient optimal algorithm is proposed. This algorithm is called ABD in the following. This paper focuses on the case where processes may commit Byzantine failures, i.e., may behave in a way that does not respect their intended behavior (as defined by their specification).
Related work
Considering the clients/servers distributed model, several articles have addressed the design of servers implementing a shared memory accessible by clients. The servers are usually managing a set of disks (e.g., [8, 13, 18] ). Moreover, while they consider that some servers can be Byzantine, some articles restrict the failure type allowed to clients. As an example, [9, 10] explore the efficiency issues (relation between resilience and fast reads) in the context where only servers can be Byzantine, while clients (the single writer and the readers) can fail by crashing. As other examples, [13] considers that clients can only commit crash failures, while [4] considers that clients can only be "semi-Byzantine" (i.e., they can issue a bounded number of faulty writes, but otherwise respect their code). The algorithm presented in [17] allows clients and some number of servers to be Byzantine, but requires clients to sign their messages. As far as we know, [1] was the first paper considering Byzantine readers while still offering maximal resilience (with respect to the number of Byzantine servers) without using cryptography. However, the writer can fail only by crashing, and the fact that a -possibly Byzantine-reader does not write a fake value in a register (to ensure the "readers have to write" rule required to implement atomicity) is ensured only with some probability.
In the peer-to-peer model (defined here as a model in which all processes are "equal"), the construction of an atomic register requires that each process manages a copy of the register that is built. The first algorithm building an atomic read/write SWMR (single-writer/multi-reader) register in a peer-to-peer message-passing system where processes may commit Byzantine failures is (to our knowledge) the one presented in [12] , called IRRS in the following. (This paper shows also that t < n/3 is an upper bound on the resilience parameter t for such a construction.) This algorithm requires each process to store the full history of the modifications applied to each SWMR register.
The fact that an SWMR register is considered is due to the following observation: as a Byzantine process can corrupt any register it can write, the design of a multiwriter/multi-reader register with non-trivial correctness guarantees is impossible in the presence of Byzantine processes. Differently, the values written in the SWMR register associated with a non-Byzantine process cannot be corrupted by a Byzantine process.
Content of the paper This paper presents a new algorithm implementing an array of n SWMR atomic registers (one per process) in a peer-to-peer asynchronous messagepassing system where up to t < n/3 processes may commit Byzantine failures. This algorithm does not require to enrich the underlying system with cryptography-based mechanisms. As the underlying system model is a peer-to-peer system model (in the sense that any process can communicate with any other process) the proposed algorithm cannot be used in a clients/servers model where each pair client/server can communicate, but clients do not communicate between themselves, and servers do not communicate between themselves.
When designing this algorithm, an aim was to obtain an algorithm whose "spirit" is "as close as possible" to ABD. We think that this is important from both understanding and pedagogical point of views. It helps better understand the "gap" between crash failures and Byzantine failures.
As the proposed algorithm, both ABD and IRRS consider the fully connected peer-to-peer asynchronous message-passing model. When comparing, from an algorithmic point of view, these algorithms to the proposed algorithm, we have the following.
• With respect to IRRS the main differences are the following.
-First, IRRS requires each process to manage the full history (sequence) of all the values written in each register. Differently, the proposed algorithm requires a process to store only a single pair (value, sequence number) per atomic register. -Second, IRRS requires each process to manage a matrix of sequence numbers, which is used to ensure the consistency of read operations. The proposed algorithm does not need such a control information.
Hence, when compared to IRRS, the proposed algorithm is simpler and has less constraining local memory requirements. • With respect to ABD, there are two main differences.
-One is the way processes implement the "reads have to write" requirement needed to obtain the atomicity property of a register [15] . -The other one lies in the broadcast operation used to disseminate new values. While a simple unreliable broadcast 1 is sufficient in the presence of process crash failures, a stronger broadcast needs to be used to cope with Byzantine processes in a signature-free system.
The resulting algorithm is particularly simple. Moreover, when considering the nonfaulty processes, a read costs O(n) messages and a write costs O(n 2 ) messages.
Roadmap
The paper is composed of 6 sections. Section 2 presents the computation model, and the underlying reliable broadcast abstraction. Section 3 presents a specification of an SWMR read/write atomic register in the presence of Byzantine processes. Then, Section 4 presents the algorithm, and Section 5 proves its correctness. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Computation Model

Process Model, Communication Model, and Failure Model
Computing entities The system is made up of a set of n sequential processes, denoted p 1 , p 2 , ..., p n . These processes are asynchronous in the sense that each process progresses at its own speed, which can be arbitrary and remains always unknown to the other processes.
Moreover, two different processes p i and p j differ only in their index i and j . Indexes are used only for addressing purposes (message sender, message receiver, and arrays entries), there is no order on them, and consequently they cannot be compared (the fact we are using integers to represent indexes is only for easiness).
Communication model
The processes cooperate by sending and receiving messages through bi-directional channels. The communication network is a complete network, which means that each process p i can directly send a message to any process p j (including itself). It is assumed that the Byzantine processes cannot control the network, hence when a process receives a message, it can unambiguously identify its sender. Each channel is reliable (no loss, corruption, or creation of messages), not necessarily first-in/first-out, and asynchronous (while the transit time of each message is finite, there is no upper bound on message transit times).
A process p i invokes the operation "send TAG(m) to p j " to send the message tagged TAG and carrying the value m. It receives a message tagged TAG by invoking the operation "receive TAG()". "broadcast TAG(m)" is a macro-operation that expands as "for each j ∈ {1, · · · , n}send TAG(m) to p j end for". (The sending order is arbitrary, which means that, if the sender crashes while executing this statement, an arbitrary subset of processes will receive the message).
Byzantine failures
The model parameter t is an upper bound on the number of processes that can exhibit a Byzantine behavior [16, 21] . A Byzantine process is a process that behaves arbitrarily: it may crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an arbitrary state, perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. Hence, a Byzantine process, which is assumed to send a message m to all the processes, can send a message m 1 to some processes, a different message m 2 to another subset of processes, and no message at all to the other processes. Moreover, while they cannot modify the content of the messages sent by non-Byzantine processes, they can read their content and reorder their deliveries. More generally, Byzantine processes can collude to "pollute" the computation.
A Byzantine process is also called a faulty process. A process that commits no failure (i.e., a non-Byzantine process) is also called a correct process.
Notation In the following, the previous computation model, restricted to the case where t < n/3, is denoted BAMP n,t [t < n/3], where BAMP stands for "Byzantine Asynchronous Message-Passing" and [t < n/3] denotes the associated model restriction on t.
Reliable Broadcast Abstraction
This section presents a reliable broadcast abstraction (denoted r-broadcast) that will be used to build an SWMR atomic register (Section 4). This abstraction is a simple generalization of a reliable broadcast due to Bracha [6] . While Bracha's abstraction is for a single broadcast, the proposed abstraction considers that each process can issue a sequence of broadcasts. It is shown in [6] that t < n/3 is a necessary requirement to cope with the net effect of asynchrony and Byzantine failures.
Specification
The reliable broadcast abstraction is defined by two operations denoted R broadcast() and R deliver(). When a process p i invokes R broadcast() we say that "p i r-broadcasts a value". Similarly, when p i returns from an invocation of R deliver() and obtains a value, we say "p i r-delivers a value".
The operation R broadcast() has two input parameters: a broadcast value v, and an integer sn, which is a local sequence number used to identify the successive rbroadcasts issued by the sender process. The sequence of numbers used by each (correct) process is the increasing sequence of consecutive integers.
• RB-Validity. If a correct process r-delivers a pair (v, sn) from a correct process p i , then p i invoked the operation R broadcast(v, sn). • RB-Integrity. Given any process p i , a correct process r-delivers at most once a pair (−, sn) from p i . • RB-Uniformity. If a correct process r-delivers a pair (v, sn) from p i (possibly faulty), then all the correct processes eventually r-deliver the same pair (v, sn) from p i . • RB-Termination. If the process that invokes R broadcast(v, sn) is correct, all the correct processes eventually r-deliver the pair (v, sn).
RB-Validity is on correct processes and relates their outputs to their inputs, namely no correct process r-delivers spurious messages from correct processes. RB-Integrity states that there is no r-broadcast duplication. RB-Uniformity is an "all or none" property (it is not possible for a pair to be delivered by a correct process and to be never delivered by the other correct processes). RB-Termination is a liveness property: at least all the pairs r-broadcast by correct processes are r-delivered by them.
For completeness, an algorithm (due to Bracha [6] ), which implements the rbroadcast abstraction in the model BAMP n,t [t < n/3], is described in Appendix A. Other Byzantine-tolerant reliable broadcast algorithms are described in [20] .
Atomic Read/Write Registers in the Presence of Byzantine Processes
Single-writer/multi-reader (SWMR) registers The fault-tolerant shared memory supplied to the upper abstraction layer is an array denoted REG [1. .n]. For each i, REG[i] is a single-writer/multi-reader (SWMR) register. This means that REG[i] can be written only by p i . To this end, p i invokes the operation REG [i] .write (v) where v is the value it wants to write into REG [i] . Differently, any process p j can read REG[i] by invoking the operation REG[i].read().
As already noticed in the Introduction, the "single-writer" requirement is natural in the presence of Byzantine processes. If registers could be written by any process, it would be possible for the Byzantine processes to pollute the whole memory, and no non-trivial computation could be possible.
On the modifications of REG[k] by a Byzantine process p k Like a correct process, a Byzantine process p k may invoke the write operation REG[k].write(v) to assign a value v to REG[k] (where v can be a correct of a fake value).
A Byzantine process p k may also try to modify REG[k] without using this operation, e.g., by sending "protocol messages" which, from the point of view of correct processes, simulate an invocation of REG [k] .write (v) . Such an attempt to modify REG[k], without invoking the operation REG [k] .write(), may succeed or not. "Succeed" means that, from the point of view of all the correct processes, v was assigned to REG[k], namely, this modification of REG[k] appears as if it had been produced by an invocation of REG[k].write() by p k . The problem in the implementation of REG[k] is then to ensure that REG[k] does not appear as being modified to some correct processes, and not modified to other correct processes. REG[k] must appear as having been modified to v to all correct processes or none of them.
Moreover the implementation of REG[k] must also ensure that none of its modifications by the Byzantine process p k is seen by some correct processes as if a was written, and seen by other correct processes as if b = a was written. As a simple example, let us assume that p k modifies REG[k] exactly once. When, after this modification, two correct processes p i and p j invoke REG [k] .read(), it is not possible for p i to obtain a, and for p j to obtain b = a. Whatever the number of REG [k] .read() any of them executes, both must always obtain the same value.
Notations Let p i and p j two correct processes. It would be possible to associate a start event and an end event with each read [i, j, x] and each write [i, y] issued by a correct process p i , so that all these events produced by the correct processes define a total order from which the notion of "terminates before" (used below) could be formally defined (as in [11, 14, 19, 23] ). To not overload the presentation, we do not use this formalization here.
• H being a sequence of values, H [x] denotes the value at position x in H .
Atomic SWMR registers in the presence of Byzantine processes
The atomicity of a set of n SWMR registers REG [1] , ..., REG[n] (some of them possibly associated with Byzantine processes) is defined by the following set of properties.
• Termination (liveness). Let p i be a correct process.
-For any j , any invocation of REG[j ].read() by p i terminates.
• Consistency (safety). Let p i and p j be two correct processes, and p k a faulty or correct process.
-Single history per process. There is exactly one sequence of values
As the behavior of a Byzantine process escapes the control of a correct algorithm, both the termination property and the constraint on the values returned by read invocations only concern correct processes.
The "Single history per process" property states that the write operations on any register are totally ordered; hence, if p k is correct, H k is the sequence of values it wrote in REG [k] .
The three other safety properties concern only the values read by correct processes. The "Read followed by write" property states that there is no read from the future, while the "Write followed by read"' property states that no read can obtain an overwritten value. Due to the possible concurrent accesses to a same register, these two properties actually define a regular register [14] . Hence the "No new/old read inversion" property, which allows to obtain an atomic register from a regular register [7, 14, 23] .
From process histories to linearizable executions When extending to Byzantine processes the notion of a process history (as defined in [11] in the context of crashprone processes), we have the following, where the history of a process is defined as follows.
• p i is correct. Its history is the sequence h i of all its read and write operations.
• p i is Byzantine. In this case, whatever the way the values H i [1] , H i [2] [2] ), etc. Moreover, while there is no notion of start event and end event for these operations, due to the sequentiality of H i , the values in H i appear to the correct processes as if they have been written one after the other by the Byzantine process p i . As already said, as the values returned by the read invocations issued by the Byzantine processes can be arbitrary values, the invocations (for any j ) of REG[j ].read() by a Byzantine process p i do not appear in its history h i . These values are irrelevant from the point of view of the correct processes.
Given a run, let C be the set of processes that are correct in this run. Given a correct process p i , let h c i be a history h i from which the read operations of the registers associated with Byzantine processes have been withdrawn.
It 
is the partial order associated with the computation restricted to the correct processes and the operations on their registers. It is possible to produce a linear extension (linearization) of OP c in which each read operation of an atomic register obtains the last value previously written in this register (see [11, 24] for such a construction). Let S = (OP c , S →) be such a linear extension.
We have now to add to S the read operations issued by the correct processes on the SWMR registers written by the Byzantine processes. This is done as follows. Let p j be a Byzantine process. To simplify the presentation (and without loss of generality) we assume that all values in H j are different. For any Byzantine process p j and any H j [x], let us consider (if any) all the operations REG[j ].read() issued by the correct processes which return the value H j [x] . The associated REG [j ] .write(H j [x]) of h j is inserted in the sequence S just before the first of these read operations. The "No read inversion" property guarantees that these additions of write operations due to Byzantine processes cannot create cycles.
Construction of Single-Writer/Multi-Reader Atomic Registers
An algorithm constructing an SWMR atomic (linearizable) register in the presence of up to t Byzantine processes, is described in Fig. 1 . As it assumes t < n/3, this algorithm is suited for the computing model BAMP n,t [t < n/3]. The algorithm presented is the code associated with a correct process p i .
The design of the algorithm strives to be as close as possible to the ABD algorithm [3] , which implements an atomic register in an asynchronous system where at most t < n/2 may crash. 2 It uses a wait(condition) statement. The corresponding process is blocked until the predicate condition becomes satisfied. While a process is blocked, it can process the messages it receives.
Local variables Each process p i manages the following local variables whose scope is the full computation (local variables are denoted with lower case letters, and subscripted by the process index i).
• reg i [1. .n] is the local representation of the array REG [1. .n] of SWMR registers.
Each local register reg i [j ] contains two fields, a sequence number reg i [j ] .sn, and the corresponding value reg i [j ] .val. It is initialized to the pair init j , 0 , where init j is the initial value of REG[j ]. • wsn i is an integer, initialized to 0, used by p i to associate sequence numbers with its successive write invocations. • rsn i [1. .n] is an array of sequence numbers (initialized to [0, · · · , 0]) such that sn i [j ] is used by p i to identify its successive read invocations of REG[j ]. 3
The operation REG[i].write(v)
This operation is implemented by the client lines 1-4 and the server lines 12-14 (which are similar to the algorithm implementing a write operation in a crash-prone system [3] ). Process p i first increases wsn i and r-broadcasts the message WRITE(v, wsn i ). Let us remark that this is the only use of the reliable broadcast abstraction by the algorithm. The process p i then waits for acknowledgments (message WRITE DONE(v, wsn i )) from (n − t) distinct processes, and finally terminates the write operation. As we will see (Lemma 2), the intersection of any two quorums of (n − t) processes contains at least one correct process. This intersection property will be used to prove the consistency of the register REG[i].
When p i r-delivers a message WRITE(v, wsn) from a process p j , it waits until wsn = reg i [j ] + 1 (line 12). Hence, whatever the sender p j , its messages WRITE() are processed in their sending order. When this predicate becomes true, p i updates accordingly its local copy with respect to REG[j ] (line 13), and sends back to p j an acknowledgment to inform it that its new write has locally been taken into account (line 14).
Write of REG[j ] by a Byzantine process p j
Let us observe that the only way for a process p i to modify reg i [j ] is to r-deliver a message WRITE(v, wsn) from a (correct or faulty) process p j . Due to the RB-Uniformity of the r-broadcast abstraction, it follows that, if a correct process p i r-delivers such a message, all correct processes will r-deliver the same message, be its sender correct or faulty. Consequently each of them will eventually execute the statements of lines 12-14.
Hence, when a faulty process invokes R broadcast WRITE(v, wsn) (be the rbroadcast invocation involved in an invocation of REG[j ].write(v) or not), its faulty behavior is restricted to broadcast fake values for v and wsn.
The operation REG[j ].read()
This operation is implemented by the client lines 5-11 and the server line 15. The corresponding algorithm is the core of the implementation of an SWMR atomic register.
When p i wants to read REG[j ], it first broadcasts a read request (message READ(j, rsn i [j ])), and waits for the corresponding acknowledgements (message STATE(rsn i [j ], −)). Each of these acknowledgements carries the sequence number associated with the current value of REG[j ], as known by the sender of the message (line 15). For p i to progress, the wait predicate (line 7) states that its local representation of REG[j ], namely reg i [j ], must be fresh enough (let us remember that the only line where reg i [j ] can be modified is line 13, i.e., when p i r-delivers a message WRITE(−, −) from p j ). This freshness predicate states that p i 's current value of reg i [j ] is as fresh as the current value of at least (n − t) processes (i.e., at least (n − 2t) correct processes). If the freshness predicate is false, it will become true when p i will have r-delivered WRITE(−, −) messages, which have been r-delivered by other correct processes, but not yet by it.
When this waiting period terminates, p i considers the current value w, wsn of reg i [j ] (line 8). It then broadcasts the message CATCH UP(j, wsn) , and returns the value w as soon as its message CATCH UP() is acknowledged by (n − t) processes (lines 9-10).
The aim of the CATCH UP(j, wsn) message is to allow each destination process p k to have a value in its local representation of REG[j ] (namely reg k [j ] .val) at least as recent as the one whose sequence number is wsn (line 15). The aim of this value resynchronization is to prevent read inversions. When p i has received the (n − t) acknowledgments it was waiting for (line 10), it knows that no other correct process can obtain a value older than the value w it returns.
Message cost of the algorithm
In addition to a reliable broadcast (whose message cost is O(n 2 )), a write operation generates n messages WRITE DONE. Hence the cost of the write is O(n 2 ) messages. A read operations costs 4n messages, n messages for each of the four kinds of messages READ, STATE, CATCH UP and CATCH UP DONE.
Comparing with the crash failure model It is known that the algorithms implementing an atomic register on top of an asynchronous message-passing system prone to process crashes, require that "reads have to write" [2, 3, 5, 15, 22] . More precisely, before returning a value, in one way or another, a reader must write this value to ensure atomicity (otherwise, we have only a "regular" register [14] ). Doing so, it is not possible that two sequential read invocations, concurrent with one or more write invocations, be such that the first read obtains a value while the second read obtains an older value (this prevents read inversion).
As Byzantine failures are more severe than crash failures, the algorithm of Fig. 1 needs to use a mechanism analogous to the "reads have to write" to prevent read inversions from occurring. As previously indicated, this is done by the messages CATCH UP() broadcast at line 9 and the associated acknowledgments messages CATCH UP DONE() received at line 10. As previously indicated, these messages realize a synchronization during which (n − t) processes (i.e., at least (n − 2t) correct processes) have resynchronized their value, if needed (line 15).
A comparison of two instances of the ABD algorithm [3] and the algorithm of Fig. 1 is presented in Table 1 . The first instance is the version of the ABD algorithm which builds an array of n SWMR (single-writer/multi-reader) atomic registers (one register per process). The second instance is the version of the ABD algorithm which builds a single MWMR (multi-writer/multi-reader) atomic register.
As they depend on the application and not on the algorithm, the size of the values which are written is considered as constant. The parameters n and t have the same meaning as before; m denotes an upper bound on the number of read and write operations on each register. The value log n is due to the fact that a message carries a 
Proof of the Construction
The model assumption n > 3t is implicit in all the statements and proofs that follow.
Preliminary Lemmas
Lemma 1 If a correct process p i r-delivers a message WRITE(w, sn) (from a correct or faulty process), any correct process r-delivers it.
Proof This is an immediate consequence of the RB-Uniformity property of the the r-broadcast abstraction.
Lemma 2 Any two sets (quorums) of (n − t) processes have at least one correct process in their intersection.
Proof Let Q 1 and Q 2 be two sets of processes such that |Q 1 | = |Q 2 | = n − t. In the worst case, the t processes that are not in Q 1 belong to Q 2 , and the t processes that are not in Q 2 belong to Q 1 . It follows that |Q 1 ∩ Q 2 | ≥ n − 2t. As n > 3t, it follows that |Q 1 ∩ Q 2 | ≥ n − 2t ≥ t + 1, which concludes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of the Termination Properties
Lemma 3 Let p i be a correct process. Any invocation of REG[i].write() terminates.
Proof Let us consider the first invocation of REG[i].write() by a correct process p i . This write operation generates the r-broadcast of message WRITE(−, 1) (lines 1-2). Due to Lemma 1, all correct processes r-deliver this message, and the waiting predicate of line 13 is eventually satisfied. Consequently, each correct process p k eventually sets reg k [i].sn to 1, and sends back to p i an acknowledgment message WRITE DONE(1). As there are least (n − t) correct processes, p i receives such acknowledgments from at least (n − t) different processes, and terminates its first invocation (lines 3-4). As, for any given any process p j , all correct processes process the messages WRITE() from p j in their sequence order, the lemma follows from a simple induction (whose previous paragraph is the proof of the base case).
Lemma 4
Let p i be a correct process. For any j , any invocation of REG[j ].read() terminates.
Proof When a correct process p i invokes REG[j ].read(), it broadcasts a message READ(j, rsn) where rsn is a new sequence number (lines 5-6). Then, it waits until the freshness predicate of line 7 becomes satisfied. As p i is correct, each correct process p k receives READ(j, rsn), and sends back to p i a message STATE(rsn, wsn), where wsn is the sequence number of the last value of REG[j ] it knows (line 15). It follows that p i receives a message STATE(j, −) from at least (n−t) correct processes. Let STATE(j, wsn 1 ), · · · , STATE(j, wsn n−t ) be these messages.
To show that the wait of line 7 terminates we have to show that the freshness predicate reg i [j ] .sn ≥ max(wsn 1 , · · · , wsn n−t ) is eventually satisfied. Let wsn be one of the previous sequence numbers, and p k the correct process that sent it. This means that reg k [j ] .sn = wsn (line 15), from which we conclude (as p k is correct) that p k has previously r-delivered a message WRITE(−, wsn) and updated accordingly reg k [j ] at line 13 (let us remember that this is the only line at which the local register reg k [j ] is updated). It follows from Lemma 1 that eventually p i rdelivers the message WRITE(−, sn). It follows then from line 13 that eventually we have reg i [j ].sn ≥ sn. As this is true for any sequence number in {wsn 1 , ..., wsn n−t }, it follows that the freshness predicate is eventually satisfied, and consequently the wait statement of line 7 is satisfied.
Let us now consider the wait statement of line 10, which appears after p i has broadcast the message CATCH UP(j, wsn), where wsn = reg i [j ] .sn (sequence number in reg i [j ] just after p i stopped waiting at line 7). We show that any correct process sends back to p i an acknowledgment CATCH UP DONE(j, wsn) at line 17. Process p i updated reg i [j ] .sn to wsn at line 13, and this occurred when it r-delivered a message WRITE(−, wsn). The reasoning is the same as in the previous paragraph, namely, it follows from Lemma 1 that all correct processes r-deliver this message and consequently we have reg k [j ] .sn ≥ wsn at every correct process p k . Hence, the value resynchronization predicate of line 16 is eventually satisfied at all correct processes, that consequently sends back a message CATCH UP DONE(j, wsn) at line 17, which concludes the proof of the lemma.
Proofs of the Consistency (Atomicity) Properties
Lemma 5 It is possible to associate a single sequence of values H i with each register REG [i] . Moreover, if p i is correct, H i is the sequence of values written by p i in
Proof To define H i let us consider all the messages WRITE(−, sn) r-delivered from a (correct or faulty) process p i by the correct processes (due to Lemma 1, these messages are r-delivered to all correct processes). Let us order these messages according to their processing order as defined by the predicate of line 12. H i is the corresponding sequence of values. (Let us notice that, if p i is Byzantine, it is possible that some of its messages WRITE() are r-delivered but never processed at lines 12-14; if any, such messages are never added to H i ).
Let us now consider the case where p i is correct. It follows from the RB-Validity property of the r-broadcast abstraction that any message r-delivered from p i , was r-broadcast by p i . It then follows from lines 1-2 that H i is the sequence of values written by p i . Proof Let p i be a correct process that returns from its x th invocation of REG [i].write(). It follows from line 1 that the sequence number x is associated with the written value. It follows from the r-broadcast of the message WRITE(v, x) issued by p i (line 2), and its r-delivery (line 12) at each correct process (RB-uniformity of the r-broadcast), that p i receives (n − t) messages WRITE DONE(x) (line 3). Let Q 1 be this set of (n − t) processes that sent these messages (line 14). Let us notice that there are at least (n − 2t) correct processes in Q 1 and, due to line 13, any of them, say p k , is such that reg k [i].sn ≥ x.
Let p j be a correct process that invokes REG [i] .read(). The freshness predicate of line 7blocks p j until reg j [i].sn ≥ max(wsn 1 , ..., wsn n−t ). Let Q 2 be the set of the (n − t) processes that sent the messages STATE() (line 15) which allowed p j to exit the wait statement of line 7.
It follows from Lemma 2 that at least one correct process p k belongs to Proof Let us consider process p i . When it terminates read [i, k, x] , if follows from the messages CATCH UP() and CATCH UP DONE() (lines 9-10 and lines [16] [17] that p i received the acknowledgment message CATCH UP DONE(k, x) from (n − t) different processes. Let Q 1 be this set of (n − t) processes. Let us notice that there are at least (n − 2t) correct processes in Q 1 , and for each of them, say p , we have reg [k].sn ≥ x.
When p j invokes REG [k] .read() it broadcasts the message READ() and waits until the freshness predicate is satisfied (lines 7). The messages STATE(−, −) it receives are from (n − t) different processes. Let Q 2 be this set of (n − t) processes.
It follows from Lemma 2 that at least one correct process p belongs to Q 1 ∩ Q 2 . According to the fact that read[i, k, x] terminates before read[j, k, y] starts, it follows that p sent CATCH UP DONE(k, x) to p i before sending the message STATE(−, s) to p j . As reg [k].sn never decreases, it follows that x ≤ s. It finally follows that, when the freshness predicate is satisfied at p j , we have reg j [k].sn ≥ s. As y = reg j [k].sn (lines 8-11), it follows that x ≤ y, which concludes the proof.
Piecing Together the Lemmas
Theorem 1 The algorithm described in Fig. 1 implements an array of n SWMR atomic (linearizable) registers (one register per process) in the system model BAMP n,t [t < n/3].
Proof The proof follows from Lemmas 3-8.
Conclusion
This paper presented a signature-free algorithm building an array of n singlewriter/multi-reader atomic registers (with a register per process) in an n-process asynchronous message-passing system where up to t < n/3 processes may commit Byzantine failures.
This algorithm relies on an underlying reliable broadcast [6] , an appropriate freshness predicate and a value resynchronization mechanism which ensures that a correct process always reads up-to-date values. A noteworthy property of this algorithm lies in its conceptual simplicity.
According to the result of [12] this algorithm is optimal from a t-resilience point of view. While the cost of a read operation is linear with respect to n, a problem which remains open lies in its O(n 2 ) message complexity for write operations. This cost is due to the use of a Byzantine-tolerant reliable broadcast. Hence the question: Is it possible to reduce it, or is O(n 2 ) a lower bound when one has to implement an atomic register in a signature-free message-passing distributed system prone to Byzantine failures? We conjecture it is a lower bound.
• When a process p i receives a message APP(v, sn) from a process, it discards it if it has already received a message APP(−, sn ) such that sn = sn. This is because, in this case p j is Byzantine (a correct process issues a single r-broadcast per sequence number). If p i has not previously received from p j a message APP(−, sn ) such that sn = sn, it waits until it can process this message according to its sequence number (line 3). When this occurs, p i broadcasts the message Echo(j, v, sn) to inform the other processes it received the application message APP(v, sn) (line 3). • Then, when p i has received the same message Echo(j, v, sn) from "enough" processes (where enough means that "more than (n + t)/2 different processes"), and has not yet broadcast a message Ready(j, v, sn), it does it (lines 6-9). The aim of (a) the messages Echo(j, v, sn), and (b) the cardinality "greater than (n + t)/2 processes", is to ensure that no two correct processes can r-deliver distinct messages from p j (even if p j is Byzantine). The aim of the messages Ready(j, v, sn) is related to the liveness of the algorithm. More precisely, its aim is to allow the r-delivery by the correct processes of the very same message APP(v, sn) from p j , and this must always occur if p j is correct. It is nevertheless possible that a message r-broadcast by a Byzantine process p j may never be r-delivered by the correct processes. • Finally, when p i has received the message Ready(j, v, sn) from (t + 1) different processes, it broadcasts the same message Ready(j, v, sn), if not yet done. This is required to ensure the RB-termination property. If p i has received "enough" messages Ready(j, v, sn) ("enough" means here "from at least (2t + 1) different processes"), it r-delivers the message APP(v, sn) r-broadcast by p j .
More explanations and proofs that this algorithm satisfies the properties defining the reliable broadcast abstraction can be found in [6, 20] .
